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I. INTRODUCTION
N OWADAYS wireless service providers (SPs) are divided into (i) mobile network operators (MNOs) that lease spectrum from a regulator like FCC, and (ii) mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) that obtain spectrum from one or more MNOs. MVNOs can distinguish their plans from MNOs by bundling their service with other products, offering different pricing plans for End-Users (EUs), or building a good reputation through a better customer service. Although traditionally wireless service has been offered only by MNOs, in recent years, the number of MVNOs has been rapidly growing. According to [4] , between June 2010 and June 2015, the number of MVNOs increased by 70 percent worldwide, reaching 1,017 as of June 2015. Even some MNOs developed their own MVNOs. An example of which is Cricket wireless which is owned by AT&T and offers a prepaid wireless service to EUs. Another example of MVNOs is the Google's Project Fi in which the customer's service is handled using Wi-Fi hotspots wherever/whenever they exist; elsewhere the service is handled using the spectrum of a number of MNOs, eg, Sprint, T-Mobile or U.S. Cellular networks.
In this work, we consider the economics of the interaction among MNOs and MVNOs. We seek to understand why and under what conditions the MNOs cooperate with the MVNOs by offering some of their spectrum to the MVNOs, and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of EUs. We consider scenarios where the MNOs decide on acquiring new spectrum, and in exchange for a fee offer those to MVNOs, which decide to acquire some of the spectrum offered. The SPs decide on their pricing strategies for the EUs, and the EUs decide to opt for one of them, or neither, if the access fees and the qualities of service are not satisfactory. The spectrum acquisition and pricing decisions of the SPs determine their respective profits. We characterize their equilibrium choices. We obtain metrics that quantify the cooperation and competition of the SPs in terms of their spectrum investments and subscriptions of EUs, which help quantify the interplay between competition and cooperation under the equilibrium choices.
We consider a hotelling model in which a continuum of undecided EUs decide which of the SPs they want to buy their wireless plan from, if at all. The EUs have different preferences for each SP. These preferences can be because of different services and qualities that SPs offer. For example, the MVNOs may be able to offer a free or cheap international call plan through VoIP, or an SP may have an infamous customer service. The preference for a SP also increases with the spectrum she acquires. If, for example, EUs have high preferences for MVNOs, then the MNOs may prefer to lease some of their spectrum to the MVNOs and receive their share of profit through the MVNOs, instead of competing for EUs by lowering their access fees. On the other hand, if EUs have high preferences for the MNOs, the MNOs may not offer spectrum to the MVNOs and seek to attract the EUs directly. Thus, cooperation is mutually beneficial only in some scenarios, which we seek to identify.
We start with by considering a base case in which arXiv:1905.13423v1 [cs.GT] 31 May 2019 one MNO and one MVNO compete for EUs in a common pool, and the EUs have to choose one of the SPs (Section II). We consider a sequential game in which the SPs decide their spectrum investments and access fees for the EUs (Section II-A). We subsequently seek the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the game using backward induction (Section II-E), and identify conditions under which the SPNE outcome of the game exists and is unique, and characterize the SPNE whenever it exists. The SPNE is simple to compute, as 1) the amount of spectrum the MNO invests turns out to be the value that maximizes a function involving only one decision variable 2) the amount of spectrum the MVNO leases from the MNO is a simple closed form expression involving the amount that the MNO offers it and the leasing fee 3) the access fees for the EUs constitute simple closed form expressions of the spectrum the SPs acquire. The characterizations provide several insights. The spectrum acquired by the MNO never falls below a threshold which depends only on the leasing fee to the MVNO and preferences for the SPs. When the spectrum equals this threshold, the MVNO reserves the entire spectrum that the MNO offers it. Thus cooperation is high in this case. As the MNO acquires higher amounts of spectrum, the MVNO reserves progressively lower amounts, leading to lower degrees of cooperation. Numerical computations reveal that the MNO acquires minimal amount of spectrum only when the leasing fee to the MVNO is smaller than a threshold (Section II-D). The SPNE characterizations show that higher degrees of cooperation invariably reduces (enhances, respectively) the efficacy of the MNO (MVNO, respectively) in competing for the EUs; yet, higher degrees of cooperation enhance the payoffs of both the SPs as our numerical computations reveal. The MNO's loss in revenue from subscription is more than compensated by the leasing fees obtained from the MVNO.
Next, we generalize the hotelling model for EU subscription in the base case by incorporating an additional demand function (Section III). The effects of the demand function are two-fold. First, the demand function models the attrition in the number of EUs of SPs if the spectrum investment or price of both SPs is not desirable for EUs. Thus, in effect, an EU may opt for neither SP if neither offers a price-quality combo that is to his satisfaction, which is equivalent to opting for outside options. Second, the demand function models an exclusive additional customer base for each of the SPs to draw from depending on her investment and the price she offers. We characterize the unique interior SPNE outcome of the game (Section III-A). Numerical results reveal that the general behavior of the SPNE outcome are as in the base case (Section III-B).
Finally, we generalize the base case to include competition between MNOs. We consider a wireless market with two MNOs and one MVNO, in which EUs choose one of the three SPs (Section IV). We generalize the hotelling model to consider three players instead of two in the classical ones (Section IV-A), and characterize the unique SPNE outcome (Section IV-B). The characterizations show that this enhanced competition 1) increases the degree of cooperation, as the MVNO acquires all the spectrum that the MNOs offer, and 2) is beneficial to EUs, as the amounts of spectrum of SPs acquires are higher, and the SPs charge the EUs less.
While in this work we consider that the SPs arrive at their decisions individually, in the accompanying sequel we consider that the SPs arrive at certain decisions as a group, and then arrive at other decisions individually (Part II). Also, here we assume that the per unit leasing fee the MVNO pays to MNO(s) is a fixed parameter, which is beyond the control of individual MNOs and MVNOs, perhaps determined by the overall market evolution. Note that the overall market may consider several MNOs and MVNOs, whose presence we consider in the generalizations (Section III, IV). We investigate the implications of different values of this fee on the SPNE and the payoffs. In the sequel we consider that the SPs cooperatively characterize this fee as a decision variable in a bargaining framework (Part II).
We position our work in context of the existing literature for interaction among MNOs and MVNOs, and defer to the sequel a more detailed literature review on the interaction among arbitrary SPs (Part II). In [1] MNOs seek to maximize the joint profit of MNO and MVNO. The selection of access fees by a MNO is formulated as a maximization problem in which the sales of the MNO is expressed as a function of only the price he selects. In contrast we consider that each SP seeks to maximize his individual profit and obtain the access fees they select and the spectrum they acquire, which also determine how the EUs choose between the SPs. Thus we need to dwell in the realm of a hierarchical game rather than a single stage optimization. A scenario very different from ours is considered in [2] : the SPs do not compete for consumer market shares but for the proportion of resource they are going to use. The interaction between the SPs is a hierarchical game in which the MNO and MVNO choose their access fees, the MVNO also decide investment in content/advertising. The access fees become roots of a fourth order polynomial equation which is computed numerically. The closest to our work is [3] , which considers a dynamic three-level sequential game of spectrum sharing between one MNO and one MVNO. The focus is however complementary to ours.
Unlike our work, [3] does not consider decisions of the 1) MNO pertaining to how much spectrum to acquire from a regulatory body 2) MVNO pertaining to how much of the MNO's spectrum offer it ought to accept (it assumes that the MVNO uses the entire spectrum the MNO offers). We also generalize our model to consider multiple MNOs and an MVNO, which [3] does not.
[3] however considers a decision of the MVNO that we do not, i.e., how much it would invest in content generation. The customer subscription models are also entirely different. We consider a one-shot game involving a continuum of EUs in which the SP choice of each EU is based on his intrinsic preferences for the SPs and the spectrum investments of the SPs.
[3] considers a multi-time slot game in which a discrete number of EUs choose between the SPs based on their experiences in the previous slots and their estimates of the quality of service the SPs they had not chosen apriori offer. The games we consider fundamentally differ in that the SPNE need not exist in ours (we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence), while it always exists in that in [3] . By exploiting the structure of the game, we are able to obtain closed form expressions for the various decisions we consider, in the SPNE, whenever it exists.
[3] computes the SPNE only numerically through the solution of a multi-slot stochastic dynamic program (DP). Our SPNE characterization is easy to compute, while DPs usually suffer from the curse of dimensionality.
II. BASE CASE
We present the system model in which we formulate the payoffs and strategies of SPs, and the utilities and decisions of EUs (Section II-A). Next, we formulate the interaction between different entities as a sequential game (Section II-B). Subsequently, we characterize the conditions under for the existence and the uniqueness of the SPNE, obtain closed form expressions for the SPNE when it exists (Section II-C). We present numerical results in Section II-D. We prove the analytical results in Section II-E, Appendix B and Appendix D.
A. Model
SPs: We consider one MNO (SP L , L represents leader) and one MVNO (SP F , F represents follower) which compete for a common pool of undecided EUs. SP L offers I L amount of spectrum (which it acquires from a regulator) to SP F in exchange of money, and SP F uses I F amount of this spectrum. Clearly, 0 ≤ I F ≤ I L . For simplicity of analysis and formulation, we assume that I L ≥ δ > 0, where δ is a parameter of choice. This assumption is not significantly restrictive as δ may be respectively) . The former fraction of EUs is n L , the latter is n F . x 0 is farther off from SP L as t L becomes lower and v L − v F become higher.
chosen as low a positive quantity as one desires. Both SP L and SP F earn by selling wireless plans to EUs; SP L earns additionally by leasing her spectrum to SP F . We assume that both SP L and SP F have access to separate spectrum, which they can use to serve the EUs who join them, above and beyond the I L , I F amounts they strategically acquire. For example, a SP F like Google's Project Fi serves customers using Wi-Fi hotspots and the spectrum of 3 MNOs (Sprint, T-Mobile or U.S. Cellular networks). Also, SP L may acquire additional spectrum from the regulator which it does not offer SP F .
We denote the marginal leasing fee (per spectrum unit) that SP L pays the regulator as γ, marginal reservation fee SP F pays to SP L by s, the fraction of EUs that SP F and SP L attract as n F and n L , respectively, and the access fee that SP F and SP L charge the EUs as p F and p L , respectively. Since SP L wants to lease out some of her spectrum to SP F with profit motive, it is reasonable to assume that s > γ. We assume that s, γ are pre-determined. The strategies of SPs are to choose the investment levels (I L , I F ) and the access fees for EUs (p L , p F ) so as to maximize their overall payoffs, which we formulate next. SP F and SP L respectively earn revenues of
where c is the transaction cost SPs incur in subscription. We expect the cost of reserving spectrum to be strictly convex, i.e. the cost of investment per spectrum unit increases with the amount of spectrum 1 . For simplicity in analysis, we consider these costs to be quadratic and discuss generalizations in Remark 3. That is, SP L incurs a spectrum acquisition cost of γI 2 L , and SP F pays to SP L a leasing fee of sI 2 F . Thus, the payoffs of SPs are:
1 These costs do not satisfy the economy of scale; the regulator may mandate such structures to stop excessive acquisition by big SPs seeking to control the market, which has limited spectrum supply, and drive out smaller SPs or new entrants. Incidentally, several seminal works have considered strictly convex investment costs, e.g. [5] and [6] .
EUs:
We use a hotelling model to describe how EUs choose between the SPs. We assume that SP L is located at 0, SP F is located at 1, and EUs are distributed uniformly along the unit interval [0, 1] (Figure 1 ). The closer an EU to an SP, the more this EU prefers this SP to the other. Note that the notion of closeness and distance is used to model the preference of EUs, and may not be the same as physical distance. Let t L (t F ) be the unit transport cost of EUs for SP L (SP F ), the EU located at x ∈ [0, 1] incurs a cost of t L x (respectively, t F (1 − x)) when joining SP L (respectively, SP F ).
The EU at x receives utilities u L (x), u F (x) respectively from SP L and SP F , and joins the SP that gives it the higher utility.
The first component of the utility functions comprises of the "static factors", namely v L and v F of SP L and SP F , respectively. The static factor of an SP is the same for all EUs, which depends on the local presence, its existing spectrum beyond I L or I F and its reputation in the region, quality of the customer-service, ease of usage for the online portals, etc. However, the static factors do not depend on strategies of SPs, such as the access fees, the investment levels, etc.
, is denoted as the "strategy factor". The strategy factors depend on the strategies of the SPs, namely their access fees and the spectrum I L , I F they acquire. Clearly, the utilities would decrease with the access fees, we consider the dependence to be linear. As SP F acquires greater fraction of the additional spectrum SP L offers him, SP F becomes more desirable and SP L less desirable to the EUs. Denote t L = I F /I L and t F = (I L −I F )/I L . Then the impact of quality of service in the decision of EUs is captured through t L and t F . For example, when I F = I L , i.e., SP F leases the entire I L spectrum from SP L and SP L can use none of it, then t F = 0 and t L = 1. This gives SP F an advantage over SP L in attracting EUs. Similarly, even when I F = 0, i.e., SP F leases no spectrum from SP L , t F = 1 and t L = 0, SP F has an advantage over SP L . But subscription may still be divided in both the above extreme cases. This happens since both SP F and SP L have access to separate spectrum as reflected in the static factors v F , v L . Note that the pair of transport cost (
is one of the many functions that can be considered. We choose this model specifically since it captures the essence of the model, and is analytically tractable.
Finally, the strategy factors incorporate intrinsic preference of the EUs towards the SPs through the coordinate x, which presents the local distance in the utility model. If an EU is for example close to SP F , x is high and 1 − x is low, and it is deemed to have a higher intrinsic preference for SP F , as compared to SP L . The intrinsic preference may be developed through preexisting and ongoing relations the EU has with the SPs, e.g., if an EU is already availing of other services from an SP, the EU will have a stronger intrinsic preference for the SP, due to convenience of billing etc. Higher intrinsic preferences enhance utilities of the SP for the EUs. The impact of the strategies of the SPs on the EUs will depend on their intrinsic preferences for the EUs, which is captured in the term t L x or t F (1 − x) in the utility. Note that the intrinsic preference is different for different EUs unlike the static factor.
As is common for hotelling models, we assume that each EU chooses exactly one SP to subscribe to, i.e., the market is "fully covered". An equivalent assumption is to consider the static factors v L and v F to be sufficiently large so that the utility of EUs for buying a wireless plan is positive regardless of the choice of SP. We would in effect relax this assumption in Section III. SP F 's leasing of spectrum from SP L constitute an act of cooperation. Thus, we call I F /I L the degree of cooperation. Since SP F and SP L compete to attract EUs, the split of subscription (n L , n F ) represent the level of competition. Since the amount of spectrum SP F leases from SP L determines the split of subscription, there is a natural interplay between cooperation and competition, that these metrics will enable us to quantify.
B. The sequential game framework
The interaction among SPs and EUs can be formulated as a sequential game. As a leader of the game, SP L makes the first moves. The timing and the stages of the game are as following:
• Stage 1: SP L decides on the amount of spectrum, I L , to acquire. • Stage 2: SP F decides on the amount of spectrum to lease from SP L , I F .
• Stage 3: SP L and SP F determine the access fees for the EUs, p L and p F , respectively. • Stage 4: Each EU subscribes to the SP that gives it the higher utility. Remark 1. We assume that the decision of investments (I L and I F ) happens before the decisions of access fees (p L and p F ), guided by the fact that spectrum investment decisions are long-term ones, and are therefore expected to be constants over longer time horizons in comparison to subscription pricing decisions. 
C. The SPNE outcome
We next identify the conditions under which SPNE exists, characterize the SPNE when it exists, and examine its uniqueness.
, in the expressions for utilities in (3), |∆| ≥ 1 provides a near insurmountable disadvantage to one of the SPs through the static factors; this SP might have to choose a significantly lower price to recoup. Thus, we focus on the range |∆| < 1. As stated before, we assume δ is small, and let δ < 2−∆ 9s , which reduces to δ < 2 9s in the special case that
Theorem 1. Let |∆| < 1. The SPNE is:
(1) Any solution of the following maximization is
Remark 2. The SPNE is unique provided the maximization in Theorem 1 (1) has a unique solution, which appears to be the case as per our extensive numerical computations. Otherwise every solution of this maximization leads to a distinct SPNE.
The proof is given in Appendix D-A. The SPNE is easy to compute, despite the expressions being cumbersome. This is because I * L can be obtained as a maximizer of an expression that involves only one decision variable, I L , and fixed parameters s, γ, ∆. I * From Theorem 1 (3) the price the EUs receive from SP L (SP F , respectively) decrease (increase, respectively) with increase in the degree of cooperation (I F /I L ). Thus, since at least one of the SPs reduce the price, the EUs benefit from higher degree of cooperation.
From Theorem 1 (3) and (4)
Thus, SPNE subscriptions of the SPs increase with increase in the access fees they announce. This counter-intuitive feature arises because the subscriptions also depend on the spectrum acquisitions of the SPs, through the transport costs t L = I F /I L and t F = 1 − t F in the utilities specified in (3).
From Theorem 1 (1), in the SPNE, SP L acquires at least 2−∆ 9s amount of spectrum. From Theorem 1 (2), when I * L equals this minimum, then SP F reserves all the available spectrum, i.e., I * The results illustrate the interplay between cooperation and competition. From Theorem 1 (4), the subscription n * L (n * F , respectively) of SP L (SP F ) decreases (increases, respectively) with the degree of cooperation (I F /I L ). Thus, the higher the degree of cooperation, lesser (greater, respectively) is the competition efficacy of SP L (SP F , respectively). A natural question arises: why would the SP L then cooperate with the SP F ? From (1) and (2), Theorem 1 (3), (4), π L = n * 2 L +sI * 2 F −γI * 2 L , and π F = n * 2 F − sI * 2 F . On the one hand, if the degree of cooperation increases, then the amount of subscribers of SP L decreases, thus the revenue SP L earn from the subscribers decreases. On the other hand, the payoff of SP L increases through sI * 2 F . Thus the second factor may offset the first, and the payoff of SP L may increase due to cooperation. Note that it is not a zero sum game, thus, the payoffs of both players may simultaneously increase due to cooperation. We illustrate these phenomena definitively through our numerical computations in the next section.
Finally, in the extreme case that |∆| ≥ 1:
(2) ∆ = 1 : The following interior strategy constitute an additional SPNE
The SPNE strategy is:
We prove this theorem in Appendix D-B. As is intuitive, for large ∆, all EUs subscribe to SP L , despite lower access fees selected by SP F ; the reverse happens in the other extreme, despite lower access fees selected by SP F . The extremes therefore lead to "corner equilibria", which correspond to 0, 1 as the degrees of cooperation. The SPNE is non-unique in both these extremes. For a certain range of ∆, the SPNE does not exist. Figure 2 shows the payoffs (left) and the degree of cooperation (right) under different s when ∆ = 0. The degree of cooperation reaches the maximum (= 1), i.e., I * F = I * L when s is less than a threshold (≈ 2). In , and n *
D. Numerical results
F is a constant which is independent of s. When s is larger than this threshold, I * F /I * L < 1, and decreases with s. In this case, I * L exceeds its minimum value, and SP F leases only a portion of the new spectrum invested by SP L , i.e., I * F < I * L . Thus, SP L generates more of its revenue from EUs. The payoff of SP L (SP F ) first jumps to a lower value at this threshold, and then increases (decreases) with s. At this threshold, the degree of cooperation also jumps to a lower value (< 1). Thus, higher degrees of cooperation can enhance the payoff of both SPs, and the reservation fee s enhances (reduces) the payoff of SP L (SP F ). Figure 4 plots the payoffs (left) and I L , I F (right) as a function of ∆ when |∆| < 1, the region in which the SPNE exists uniquely. We set s = 1. As expected, the payoff of SP L (SP F , respectively) increase (decrease, respectively) with increase in ∆. With increase in ∆, I L , I F may either increase or decrease, depending on whether additional spectrum provides "bang for the buck" by enticing commensurate number of EUs which depends on the EUs' prior biases (static factors) for or against the SPs. The figure shows which is the case.
E. SPNE Analysis
We use backward induction to characterize SPNE strategies, starting from the last stage of the game and proceeding backward. For simplicity and brevity, we present this analysis only for the important special case of ∆ = 0, and defer the general case to Appendix D-A. Thus, we prove Theorem 1 while applying ∆ = 0 in the corresponding expressions. Specific Theorems 3, 5, 32 are proven in Appendix B.
Stage 4: We first characterize the equilibrium division of EUs between SPs, i.e., n * L and n * F , using the knowledge of the strategies chosen by the SPs in Stages 1∼3. 
Thus, since EUs are distributed uniformly along [0, 1], the fraction of EUs with each SP is:
where x 0 is defined in (4) and n F = 1 − n L (Figure 1 ).
Only "interior" strategies may be SPNE, as: Theorem 3. In the SPNE it must be that 0 < x 0 < 1.
Stage 3: SP L and SP F determine their access fees for EUs, p L and p F , respectively, to maximize their payoffs. Lemma 1. The payoffs of SPs are: (1) and (2), and get (6).
We next obtain the SPNE p * F and p * L which maximize the payoffs π L and π F of the SPs respectively.
Theorem 4. The SPNE pricing strategies are:
Proof. p * F and p * L must satisfy the first order condition, i.e., dπ F dp F = 0 and
F and p * L are the unique SPNE strategies if they yield 0 < x 0 < 1 and no unilateral deviation is profitable for SPs. We establish these respectively in Parts A and B.
< 0, a local maxima is also a global maximum, and any solution to the first order conditions maximize the payoffs when 0 < x 0 < 1, and no unilateral deviation by which 0 < x 0 < 1 would be profitable for the SPs. Now, we show that unilateral deviations of the SPs leading to n L = 0, n F = 1 and n L = 1, n F = 0 is not profitable. Note that the payoffs of the SPs, (1) and (2), are continuous as n L ↓ 0, and n L ↑ 1 (which subsequently yields n F ↑ 1 and n F ↓ 0, respectively). Thus, the payoffs of both SPs when selecting p L and p F as the solutions of the first order conditions are greater than or equal to the payoffs when n L = 0 and n L = 1. Thus, the unilateral deviations under consideration are not profitable for the SPs.
Remark 3. The proof shows that x 0 , p * L , p * F do not depend on the specific nature of the costs of leasing spectrum I F , I L , neither does n * L , n * F from (5). Thus the SPNE expressions for these would remain the same for any other cost function. But, the SPNE of investment levels (I * L , I * F ) as obtained in the next results depend on the specific nature of these functions.
Stage 2: SP F decides on the amount of spectrum to be leased from SP L , I F , with the condition that 0 ≤ I F ≤ I L , to maximize π F .
Theorem 5. The SPNE spectrum acquired by SP F is:
Stage 1: SP L chooses the amount of spectrum I L to lease from the regulator, to maximize π L .
Theorem 6. The solution of the following maximization constitutes the SPNE spectrum acquired by
Let ∆ = 0. Theorem 1 follows from Theorems 3, 4 5, 32. Theorem 3 allows us to consider only interior SPNE. Parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 1 follow respectively from Theorems 32 and 5. Part (3) follows from Theorem 4, part (4) from Theorem 4 and (5).
III. EUS WITH OUTSIDE OPTIONS
We now generalize our framework to consider a scenario in which the EUs from the common pool the SPs are competing over, may not choose either of the two SPs if the service quality-price tradeoff they offer is not satisfactory. In effect, there is an outside option for the EUs. Also, each SP has an exclusive additional customer base which can provide customers beyond the common pool depending on the service quality and access fees they offer. We introduce these modifications through demand functions we describe next.
Definition 3. The fraction
2 of EUs with each SP is
Here, n L , n F represent fractional subscriptions from the common pool as before, and are determined in Stage 4 of the sequential game described in Section II-B, based on the utilities specified in (3), with v L = v F for simplicity. The demand functionsφ L (., .) andφ F (., .) can be positive or negative. A positive value denotes 2 The fraction may be replaced with actual number (of EUs) in this case, by altering scale factors in this expression and in those of the payoffs. Our results hold for both interpretations as we do not use
attracting EUs presumably from an exclusive additional customer base beyond the common pool, and a negative value denotes losing some of the EUs in the common pool to an outside option. The size of the common pool may be different from the exclusive additional customer bases of the SPs; to account for this disparity, we multiply the fractional subscriptions from the common pool, n L , n F with a constant α.
Considering θ = α, for analytical tractability:
The formulation is the same as in (1) and (2). We characterize the SPNE strategies in section III-A, and provide numerical results in Section III-B.
A. The SPNE outcome
For simplicity, we consider only interior SPNE strategies, that is, 0 < n * L , n *
With δ < 4/b, we prove in Appendix E:
Theorem 7. The interior SPNE strategies are: 
Despite the expressions being cumbersome, the characterization is easy to compute, as in Theorem 1, and lead to important insights, as enumerated below.
In both equations, intuitively, the first term,
, represents the subscription from the common pool, if there had been no attrition to an outside option. The second and third terms represent the impacts of the attritions as also the additions from the exclusive customer bases. The first term depends on the degree of cooperation similar to the the base case specified in part (4) of Theorem 1. In the special case that b = 0, i.e., when the demand functions depend only on the access fees, the third term is 0 and the demand functions capture the impact of attrition and additions in the SPNE expression for the subscriptions. For b > 0, the second and the third term together become
Thus, higher degree of cooperation decreases (increases, respectively) the subscription for SP L (SP F , respectively) even in these terms, and therefore, overall, like in the base case. Note that the subscriptions represent the efficacy in competition. However, as in the base case, the decrease in subscription does not directly lead to reduction in overall payoffs of SP L , as the deficit may be compensated through income generated by leasing spectrum to SP F . Figure 5 show that now, both n * L , n * F can decrease (eg, with changes in s) because of attrition to the outside option possibly due to decrease of I * L , I * F . We note this when s is below a threshold. Otherwise, the trends resemble Figures 2 and 3 (the base case).
B. Numerical results

IV. THE 3-PLAYER MODEL
We now generalize our framework to consider competition between MNOs, rather than that only between an MNO and an MVNO. In a 3-player model, we consider two MNOs and one MVNO competing for a common pool of EUs in a covered market (i.e., each EU needs to opt for exactly one SP). We present the model in Section IV-A, and characterize the SPNE in Section IV-B. We show that the competition among multiple SPs reduces their payoffs, but benefits the EUs: the SPs acquire higher amounts of spectrum (hence provide higher service quality), and charge the EUs less. The competition also reduces the payoffs of SPs. We prove the results in Appendix C and Appendix F.
A. Model
We consider a symmetric model and seek a symmetric equilibrium i.e., the strategies of the MNOs are the same, and the MVNO leases the same amount of spectrum from each MNO. Thus, in the SPNE,
, and n L = n L1 = n L2 . The total amount spectrum of SPs is 2I L . Thus, each MNO retains I L − I F spectrum. We define the payoffs of MVNO and MNOs as To accommodate the three SPs, we modify the hotelling model. The EUs are uniformly distributed along a circle of radius 1 on which the SPs are virtually located ( Figure 6 ). Since the radius is 1, each arc length equals the corresponding angle. Thus, the number of EUs located 1) between the MVNO and MNO i is φ 0,i and 2) between the MNOs is φ 1,2 .
We consider that φ 0,1 , φ 0,2 and φ 1,2 reflect the natural preferences of EUs for SPs (intuitively, for example, those in the arc φ 0,1 would have stronger preference for the MVNO and MNO 1 , and so on). We allow the preferences to depend on spectrum investments by defining these arcs as: φ 0,1 = φ 0,2 = h 1 (I L , I F ) and φ 1,2 = h 2 (I L , I F ) for some functions h 1 and h 2 (considering that the model is symmetric). We can now consider the transport cost as a parameter t > 0 rather than a function of I L , I F , unlike in Section II. We focus on the special case that v
Similar to (3), if an EU is located in the arc of φ 0,1 , at a distance of x from the MVNO,
Similarly, due to symmetry, if an EU is located in the arc of φ 0,2 , he does not choose MNO 1 , and suppose the distance from the EU to the MVNO is x, thus
If an EU is located in the arc of φ 1,2 , at a distance of x to the MNO 1 , then his utility is;
Now we have the following lemma,
EUs located in the arc of φ 1,2 do not choose the MVNO.
Henceforth, we only consider p L − p F < tφ 0,1 , as:
Now, from Lemma 2 and the discussion above, the MVNO and MNO i (MNO 1 and MNO 2 , respectively) compete to attract the EUs located only on the arc of φ 0,i (φ 1,2 , respectively). Thus, we define the number of EUs of any two SPs depends only on their total investment levels, i.e., for a constant ζ,
B. The SPNE outcome
, we prove in Appendix C: Theorem 9. The unique symmetric SPNE strategy, with I * L , p * L representing the choices of, and n * L subscription to, each MNO, and I * F , p * F , n * F the corresponding quantities for the MVNO, is:
Remark 4. The MVNO leases the entire new spectrum from each MNO. The degree of cooperation, I * F /I * L is 1. The characterization of the SPNE is easy to compute.
We compare the outcome of the 3-player model with the 2-player model, to understand the impact of the competition between the MNOs. To ensure consistency of comparison, we modify the 2-player model of the base case in Section II as follows:
By the same analysis method in Section II, we prove in Appendix F: Corollary 1. In the 2-player game formulation, the unique SPNE strategies are:
Comparing Theorem 9 and Corollary 1, we note that due to the competition by an additional MNO, SPs acquire higher amounts of spectrum in the 3-player model, i.e., the two MNOs order additional spectrum, and the MVNO leases the entire new spectrum from each MNO. The SPs charge the EUs less too: tπ + c, as opposed to 2tπ+c in the 2-player model. In both models, the MNO(s) and the MVNO divide the EUs equally: in the 2-player model, each SP has half of the EUs (π), while in the 3-player model, the MVNO has half of the EUs (π), and each MNO has a quarter of the EUs (π/2).
Finally, from (12) and (13), for 3 players, the payoffs are: (1) (1) If a > 0, and define the midpoint of the interval
Proof. (1). Since a > 0, then f (x) is convex, thus the maximum point can only be obtained at the boundary points, i.e., x = d or x = e. Thus,
be a corner SPNE strategy. Thus, 1) x 0 ≥ 1, or 2) x 0 ≤ 0. We arrive at a contradiction for 1) Step 1 and 2) in Step 2 respectively.
Proof. Let π * F < 0. Consider a unilateral deviation in which I F = 0, p F ≥ c. From (12), π F ≥ 0, leading to a contradiction. Now, let n * F > 0 and p * F < c. Thus, π * F < 0 which is a contradiction.
Step
The last inequality follows because p L > c and < 1. Thus, we again arrive at a contradiction.
Step 2. Let x * 0 ≤ 0. Clearly, n *
Consider a unilateral deviation by SP L , by which
We again arrive at a contradiction.
By Theorem 3 proved above henceforth we only consider interior SPNE in which 0 < x * 0 < 1.
Proof of Theorem 5 when
Substituting p F and p L from (7) into (6), using
Thus, the following maximization yields I * F :
. Referring to the terminology of
, which we denote as F 1 .
, thus
Combining (A) and (B), we obtain (8).
Proof of Theorem 32.
Proof. Substituting p L and p F from (7) into π L from (6), using
Now, the following optimization yields I * L : 
as I L ↓ 2 9s . Therefore, this case also includes the optimum solution of previous case. Thus substituting I *
to (68), (9) is obtained.
APPENDIX C THE PROOFS IN THE 3-PLAYER MODEL
Proof of Lemma 2.
Thus, all the EUs in arc φ 1,2 will choose the MVNO.
Note that φ 0,1 = φ 0,2 . Now consider the EUs in arc φ 0,1 (φ 0,2 ), at a distance of x from MNO 1 (MNO 2 , respectively). From (14) and (15)
Thus all these EUs opt for the MVNO.
Let p L − p F < tφ 0,1 . One can similarly show that the EUs in arc φ 1,2 choose either MNO 1 or MNO 2 .
Proof of Theorem 8.
Consider a unilateral deviation of the MVNO, by which p F = c, I F = 0. Thus, π F = 0, and the unilateral deviation is profitable, which is a contradiction. Thus, p * 
Since I * F and I * L are the same as before, then
The last inequality follows since p L > c and n M N O1 > 0. Thus, the unilateral deviation is profitable which leads to a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 9.
Due to Theorem 8, we consider that p L − p F < tφ 0,1 henceforth. We sequentially progress from Stage 4 to Stage 1.
Stage 4: First, we determine the constant ζ.
Lemma 5. ζ = π, and
Proof. φ 01 + φ 02 + φ 12 = 2π, then ζ = π. The rest follows from the definition of φ 01 , φ 02 , and φ 12 .
By symmetry, we only consider the split of the EUs between the MNO 1 and the MVNO.
Theorem 10.
Proof. Suppose x 0 is the indifferent location of joining MVNO and MNO1, then: 
Stage 3: Now we characterize the SPNE access fees.
Theorem 11. The SPNE access fees of EUs of SPs, (p * F , p * L ) by which 0 < x 0 < φ 0,1 , is:
Proof. Substituting (22) and (23) into (12) and (13),
F and p * L should be determined to satisfy the first order condition, i.e.,
F and p * L are the unique interior SPNE strategies if 1) they yield 0 < x 0 < φ 0,1 and p L − p F ≤ tφ 0,1 , and 2) no unilateral deviation is profitable for SPs. We establish these in Parts A and B respectively.
L and p * F are the unique maximal solutions of π L and π F , respectively for 0 < x 0 < φ 0,1 . Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, any deviation by SPs such that x 0 ≤ 0 or x 0 ≥ φ 0,1 (which yields n L = 1, n F = 0 and n L = 0, n F = 1, respectively) is not profitable.
Stage 2: We characterize the spectrum SP F acquires from SP L in the SPNE.
Theorem 12. I * F is given by:
Proof. I * F is obtained as the optimum solution of
The objective function follows from substituting (25) into (26). The constraints come from the model assumptions directly.
Referring to the terminology of
L s−tπ 2 . We denote this quantity as F 1 .
concave, and
The desired results come from (A), (B) and (C).
Stage 1: We characterize the spectrum SP L acquires from the regulator in the SPNE.
Theorem 13. Any solution to the following maximization problem constitutes
Proof. Each MNO chooses its I L as the solution of the following maximization: 
(B). Next, if I
. Therefore, this case also includes the optimum solution of previous case. Substituting
into (31), we get (30).
L . Now we take the derivatives of f 1 , f 2 , and
Theorem 9 follows from Theorems 10, 11, 14. [4] A. Morris, "Report: Number of MVNOs exceeds 1,000 globally", September 2, 2015.
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Supplementary Proofs
APPENDIX D SPNE ANALYSIS OF BASIC CASE
If SP L invests in the minimum new spectrum, i.e., I L = δ, and set p L = c, then
Thus for any Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy
If SP F leases no new spectrum from SP L , then π F = 0. So for any NE strategy (I *
Stage 4: We first characterize the equilibrium division of EUs between SPs, i.e., n * L and n * F , using the knowledge of the strategies chosen by the SPs in Stages 1∼3.
Theorem 15. The indifferent location between the two service providers is
Proof. From Definition 2,
The fraction of EUs with each SP (n L and n F ) is:
where x 0 is defined in (32).
A. The interior SPNE
In this section, we consider the interior SPNE, and the corner SPNE are considered in Appendix D-B.
Stage 3: SP L and SP F determine their prices for EUs, p L and p F , respectively, to maximize their payoffs.
Lemma 6. The utility functions of SPs are
Proof. (1) and (2), we get (34).
In the following theorem, we characterize the SPNE access fees of SPs.
Theorem 16. The interior SPNE access fees
and (p * L , p * F ) are unique if and only if
Proof. We complete the proof in two steps: we first obtain interior equilibrium access fees (p * L , p * F ) (Step 1); then we get the condition (36) and prove that p * L and p * F ) are the unique interior Nash equilibrium access fees of SP L and SP F , respectively (Step 2).
Step 1. Consider an interior SPNE, every Nash equilibrium (p * L , p * F ) should satisfy the first order condition. Get π F and π L from (34), then p * L and p *
Step 2. In this step, we prove that the p * F and p * L are the unique maximum solutions (in (A)). Then, we prove that the condition (36) is sufficient and necessary (in (B)). Finally, we show that p * F and p * L are Nash equilibrium by proving that no unilateral is profitable for SPs (in (C)).
(A). Taking the second derivative of
then p * L and p * F are the unique maximal solutions of π L and π F , respectively.
(B). Substituting (35) into (33), we have
From (37), 0 < x 0 < 1 if and only if (36) holds. Therefore if (36) does not hold, then
Based on the results in Theorem 16, we can obtain the payoffs of SPs as follows,
Proof. First, we consider interior equilibrium strategies, from (34) in Theorem 16 , we have
From (i) and (ii), we can obtain (38).
Proof. First, we consider interior equilibrium strategies, from (34), we have
From (i) and (ii), we get (39).
Based on the proof of Theorem 16, the existence of equilibria are showed in the following statement:
Proof. From Theorem 16, if (36) holds, then no corner
In Stage 2 and Stage 1, we characterize the optimum investment levels I * L and I * F of SPs. To analyze easily, we consider 4 sections:
In this section, we consider −1 < v L − v F < 1. First, we show that if an SPNE exists when −1 < v L − v F < 1, then it must be an interior SPNE (in Proposition 1). Then, we characterize the unique optimum I * F (in Theorem 17) and an optimum I * L (in Theorem 18), respectively. Finally, we collect the optimum strategies in Stages 1∼4, and prove that this
is an interior Nash equilibrium strategy.
Thus from (40),
So (36) holds for any
Stage 2: SP F decides on the amount of spectrum to be leased from SP L (I F ), with the condition that 0 ≤ I F ≤ I L , to maximize π F . Since we assume δ is small, then let δ < min(
).
Proof. From (38) and Proposition 1, the optimal investment level of SP F , I * F , is a solution of the following optimization problem,
and π F is a quadratic function. We discuss the optimal solutions in two cases:
, and (ii)
. We denote F 1 as
, then π F is a convex function.
From Lemma 3, the maximum is obtained at I *
From Lemma 3,
.
From (A) and (B), we obtain (41). Given v L , v F , s and I L , I * F is the unique maximum of π F , so no unilateral deviation is beneficial for SP F .
Stage 1: SP L decides on the amount of spectrum I L to lease from the central regulator, to maximize her payoff, π L .
Proof. Substituting I * F in (41) into (39), the optimal investment level of SP L , I * L , is a solution of the following optimization problem,
, then I *
. This case can be considered as part of the next part.
Therefore, this case also includes the optimum solution of previous case. Thus in this case (45) is equivalent to
Collect all interior equilibria of p * F , p * L , and I * F , I * L , we have
(2) I * F is characterized in
In this section, we consider 1 ≤ v L −v F < 2. First, give the conditions under which the interior SPNE may exist (Proposition 2). Then, We obtain an optimum I * F (in Theorem 19) and I * L (in Theorem 20), respectively. Finally, we find the SPNE I * F and I * L . Since we assume δ is small, so let
Proof. From Corollary 2, no corner equilibrium strate-
then from (40), (46) and (47),
Stage 2: SP F decides on the amount of spectrum to be leased from SP L (I F ), with the condition that 0 ≤ I F ≤ I L , to maximize π F .
then the optimum investment level of SP F , I * F can be obtained by the following rules:
Proof. From (38) and Proposition 2, I * F is obtained by the following optimization problems,
, then
is a linear function of
which means SP F always wants to make a deviation to get a higher payoff by decreasing the investment level
There exists no optimum I * F in this case.
is a constant, and I * F can be any number in the interval (0,
. π F is a quadratic function.The symmetric axis
In addition,
which means
So the optimum investment level
From Lemma 3, we have
From (A) and (B), we obtain the desired results. Given v L , v F , s and I L , if I * F exists, then I * F is the unique maximum of π F , so no unilateral deviation is beneficial for SP F .
Stage 1: In this stage, MNO decides on the level of investment I L with the condition that I L ≥ δ, to maximize his payoff π L .
Proof. Substituting I * F in Theorem 19 into (39), then the optimal investment level of SP L , I * L , is a solution of the following optimization problem,
We have two subcases
, and π L is an increasing function of
, which implies SP L always wants to make a deviation, then no SPNE exists.
. Thus SPNE exists only when I *
thus this case can be considered as part of the above part. Therefore
(C). Now we compute π F , from Theorem 19, denote
Taking the derivative with respect to t,
2 , 2), and f (t) ≤ 0 when t ∈ [1,
2 ). Thus, f max (t) = f (1) = 0, which implies the possible interior equilibrium is t = 1, i.e.,
Then, we can calculate
It is easy to check that if
In this section, we consider −2 < v L − v F ≤ −1. First, give the conditions under which the interior SPNE may exist (Proposition 3). Then, we prove that no interior SPNE exists (Theorem 22). Since we assume δ is small, then let δ <
Proof. From Corollary 2, no negative-corner and positive-corner equilibria exist if
Stage 2: SP F decides on the amount of spectrum to be leased from SP L (I F ), with the condition that 0 ≤ I F ≤ I L , to maximize π F . (1) I *
Proof. From (38), the optimal investment level of SP F , I * F , is the solution of the following optimization problem,
which means SP F always wants to make a deviation to get a higher payoff by increasing the investment level
, then π F is a quadratic function, and the symmetric axis
from Lemma 3 (1),
which means SP F always wants to make a deviation to get a higher payoff by increasing the investment level. Therefore, no interior equilibria I * F exists in this case.
From Lemma 3 (2),
Note that
Since I * F is the unique maximum of π F , so no unilateral deviation is beneficial for SP F . From (A) and (B), we obtain the desired results.
Proof. Substituting I * F in Theorem 21 into (39), the optimum investment level of SP L , I * L , is a solution of the following optimization problem,
. Hence
,
which implies SP L always wants to make a deviation to get a higher payoff by decreasing the investment level
). Therefore there exists no interior equilibria I * L in this case.
which is contradicted by 0 ≤ I F ≤ I L , thus R = ∅. Therefore, (36) does not hold for any I L ≥ δ and
Thus no interior SPNE access fees exist, hence no interior Nash equiliberium strategies exist.
B. Corner SPNE
We assume δ is small, so let δ < 1 √ 2s in this section.
Step 1. We prove p *
We can choose some 0
Now consider another unilateral deviation of SP F , p F = p * F + , where 0 < < 1, with all the rest the same, then
The last inequality follows because we can choose 0 < < 1 such that p F = p * F + < c + 1. Thus, we arrive at a contradiction.
Step 2. We prove p *
Step 3. We prove I * F = 0 and π * F = 0. For any SPNE (I * F , p * F ), we have π * F ≥ 0. Otherwise, assume π F < 0, we consider a unilateral deviation I F = 0 and p F = c, then π F = 0, which is beneficial for SP F . If n *
Step 4.
Recall that
L + , where 0 < < 1, with all the rest the same, then
The last inequality follows because we can choose 0 < < 1 such that p L = p * L + < c + 1. Thus, we arrive at a contradiction.
, then the unique corner SPNE strategy is:
Proof.
L − , where 0 < < 1, with all the rest the same, then
The last inequality follows because we can choose 0
can not be an SPNE.
Step 2. We prove p * F ≥ c + 1. Suppose p * F < c + 1, consider a unilateral deviation of SP F , p F = p * F + , where 0 < < 1, with all the rest the same, then
The last inequality follows because we can choose 0 < < 1 such that p * F + < 1 + c. Thus, p * F < c + 1 can not be an SPNE.
Therefore from Steps 1, 2, if
F , thus no corner SPNE exists. Now we consider
Step 3. We prove that no unilateral deviation is beneficial for both SPs when c + 1 ≤ p *
Consider another unilateral deviation of SP F , p F = p * F + , where 0 < < 1, with all the rest the same, then
which implies no unilateral deviation is beneficial for SP L .
F into (2), thus the optimal investment level of SP F , I * F , is the solution of the following optimization problem,
is a concave function, and the symmetric axis is
which is equivalent to
Since I * F is the unique maximum of π F , thus no unilateral deviation is beneficial to SP F .
Step 5. Find I * L . Substituting I * F from Step 4 into (1), the optimum investment level of SP L , I * L , is a solution of the following optimization problem,
Then, we consider three cases
thus the optimization (53) can be written as
, and π * L,1 < 0.
Therefore, SP L always wants to make a deviation to get a higher payoff by increasing the investment level (I L ↑ ∞), so there exist no negative-corner equilibria I * L in this case.
, which means SP L always wants to make a deviation to get a higher payoff by decreasing the investment level (I L ↓ 1 √ 2s
). Therefore there exist no negative-corner equilibria I * L in this case.
. Denote
(D). In this step, we prove that
which implies SP L always wants to make a deviation to get a higher payoff by increasing the investment level (I L ↑ ∞), so there exist no negative-corner equilibria I * L in this case.
, then the unique negativecorner SPNE strategy is:
From Steps 1, 3 in Lemma 10, I *
F − , where 0 < < 1, with all the rest the same, then
Thus,
In addition, we prove that no unilateral deviation is beneficial for both SPs when c + 1
, where 0 < < 1, with all the rest the same, then
which implies no unilateral deviation is beneficial for SP F .
Consider another unilateral deviation of SP L , p L = p * L + , where 0 < < 1, with all the rest the same, then
Step 2. Find I * F = 0. From Lemma 10, I * F = 0, and any other I * F can not be a SPNE.
Step 3. 
where
and α > 0, k and b are constants.
Stage 3: We consider interior NE strategies, i.e., 0 < n F , n L < 1. Using Definition 4, (1), (2) and (33), note that v L = v F , the payoffs of SPs are:
Then, we characterize the NE of access fees, Theorem 26. For given I F and I L , the NE strategies of access fees are unique, and are:
if and only if I L satisfies:
Proof. In this case, every NE by which 0 ≤ x 0 ≤ 1, should satisfy the first order condition. Thus p *
Take the second derivative of π L with respect to
L and p * F are the unique maximal solutions of π L and π F , respectively. Thus, p * F and p * L are the unique interior NE strategies if and only if 0 < x 0 < 1. Substituting (57), t L = I F /I L , and t F = (I L − I F )/I L into (4) yields:
Once I L is fixed, Ψ(I F ) would be a linear function of I F . Thus, 0 < Ψ(I F ) < 1 for any values of I F such that 0 ≤ I F ≤ I L , if and only if
Stage 2: Based on the NE strategies of access fees, we obtain the optimum investment level of the MVNO.
Then, the unique optimal investment level of SP F , I * F , is:
Proof. First, we give the following the lemma Lemma 11. The optimum investment level I * F is obtained by
Proof. Substituting (57) into π F in (56), we get the objective function. The constraints come from the model assumptions directly.
We consider different cases. First, we consider the case that 2αf 2 (I L )−s = 0 (Step (i)). Then, we consider the case that 2αf 2 (I L ) − s = 0 and π F is a quadratic function of I F (Step (ii)). In Step (iii), we prove that I * F = 0. Combining the steps yields the result of the theorem.
Step (ii): Now, consider the case that 2αf 2 (I L ) − s = 0 and π F is a quadratic function of I F . We characterize the optimum answer in two cases: (a) if 2αf 2 (I L ) − s > 0, and (b) if 2αf 2 (I L ) − s < 0, π F (I F ; I L ).
For the case that π F is a quadratic function, we use the solution to the first order condition (I
Case (ii-a): If 2αf 2 (I L ) − s > 0, then π F is convex function. From Lemma 3 (1),
Case (ii-b): If 2αf 2 (I L ) − s < 0, then π F is a concave function. Thus, from Lemma 3 (2),
Step ( Hence I * F = 0 can not be an equilibrium solution for SP F .
Combining Steps (i), (ii), and (iii), we obtain the desired results.
Stage 1
Finally, we characterize the optimum investment level of the MNO. 
Proof. Substituting (57) into π L in (56), we get the objective function. The constraints come from the model assumptions directly.
We define functions f (I L ), g(I L ), π L (I F ) and sets L 1 , L 2 as follows:
Collecting results in Stages 1∼4, we have
Corollary 5. The interior SPNE strategies are:
(1) I * L is characterized in
(2) I * F is characterized in 
Since EUs are distributed uniformly along [0, 2π] , the fraction of EUs with each SP is:
where x 0 is defined in (62) and n F = 2π − n L .
Only "interior" strategies may be SPNE, as:
Theorem 29. In the SPNE it must be that 0 < x 0 < 2π.
Proof. Let (p * L , p * F , I * L , I * F ) be a corner SPNE strategy. Thus, 1) x 0 ≥ 2π, or 2) x 0 ≤ 0. We arrive at a contradiction for 1) Step 1 and 2) in Step 2 respectively. Proof. Let π * F < 0. Consider a unilateral deviation in which I F = 0, p F ≥ c. From (2), π F ≥ 0, leading to a contradiction. Now, let n * F > 0 and p * F < c. Thus, π * F < 0 which is a contradiction.
Step 1. Let x * 0 ≥ 2π. Clearly, n * F = 0 and n * L = 2π. 
The last inequality follows because p L > c and < min(1, t). Thus, we again arrive at a contradiction.
Step 2. Let x * 0 ≤ 0. Clearly, n * F = 2π, n * L = 0. Since n * F > 0, by Lemma 12, p * F ≥ c. From (4),
Consider a unilateral deviation by SP L , by which p L = 2πt + p * F − , 0 < < min(1, t). Then
Therefore, by (64),
Since p * F ≥ c, and < min(1, t). Then, π L − π * L > 0. We again arrive at a contradiction.
By Theorem 29 proved above henceforth we only consider interior SPNE in which 0 < x * 0 < 2π.
Stage 3: SP L and SP F determine their access fees for EUs, p L and p F , respectively, to maximize their payoffs.
Lemma 13. The payoffs of SPs are:
Proof. From (62) and (63), substitute (n L , n F ) = (π + (1) and (2), and get (65).
Theorem 30. The SPNE pricing strategies are:
Proof. p * F and p * L must satisfy the first order condition, i.e., dπ F dp F = 0 and dπ L dp L = 0. Thus, p * F = p * L = c + 2πt. p * F and p * L are the unique SPNE strategies if they yield 0 < x 0 < 2π and no unilateral deviation is profitable for SPs. We establish these respectively in Parts A and B. 2 π F dp 2
2 π L dp 2 L < 0, a local maxima is also a global maximum, and any solution to the first order conditions maximize the payoffs when 0 < x 0 < 2π, and no unilateral deviation by which 0 < x 0 < 1 would be profitable for the SPs. Now, we show that unilateral deviations of the SPs leading to n L = 0, n F = 2π and n L = 2π, n F = 0 is not profitable. Note that the payoffs of the SPs, (1) and (2), are continuous as n L ↓ 0, and n L ↑ 2π (which subsequently yields n F ↑ 2π and n F ↓ 0, respectively). Thus, the payoffs of both SPs when selecting p L and p F as the solutions of the first order conditions are greater than or equal to the payoffs when n L = 0 and n L = 2π. Thus, the unilateral deviations under consideration are not profitable for the SPs.
Theorem 31. The SPNE spectrum acquired by SP F is: I * F = 0.
Proof. Substituting p F and p L from (66) into (65), SP F 's payoff becomes,
Since π F (I F ; I L ) is a decreasing function of I F and 0 ≤ I F ≤ I L , so I *
Theorem 32. The SPNE spectrum acquired by SP F is:
Proof. Substituting p L and p F from (66) into (65), SP L 's payoff becomes:
since from Theorem 31, I * F = 0. Note that π L is a decreasing function of I L , and I L ≥ δ, so I * L = δ. Collecting all SPNE from Stages 1∼4, the unique SPNE strategies are:
